“Most agencies do not need to be reminded of the need for complete candor with the Office of the Attorney General or the Court. Agencies must be diligent to disclose documents to us for production during litigation and provide us with agency affidavits that are completely accurate. Most agencies have avoided the problems that result from a failure to be forthcoming, and agency counsel have always acted conscientiously to avoid these incidents. … We will be happy to assist you in sending the message that the state must at all times be forthcoming and accurate, and I ask that you let your clients know that I will not stand for anything less. We generally have avoided the need for me to exercise the power to overrule an agency’ s position in litigation, but I view lack of candor as one of the most legitimate occasions for me to use that power and if necessary I will do so. “-

—Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger (1991-1999)¹

Government attorneys acting on behalf of state agencies have obligations to both the the client they represent and the general public.   Two approaches exist.  The “hired gun” model approach is no different from a private attorney representing a private client by zealously advocating for a preferred decision while the “minister of justice” model seeks to guide the court to the right and  just decision.

Assuming the interests are legal and no violations of professional conduct are involved the the strategic decisions in the “hired gun” approach are left completely up to the client.  Once decided the attorney must zealously pursue a preferred outcome regardless of its impact on the opposing party or others.  According to this model government attorneys are not in a position to determine the “public interest” and even if they were they should not take it into account because it is the agency that is politically accountable.  not the attorney². The hired gun model employs blind faith and deference to the agency and presupposes its integrity and competency and, as emphasized by former Mass AGO Harschbarger above, it also  requires “complete candor.” He also states:

“Compliance with the law goes to the heart of your function as agency counsel and the role of my office as attorneys representing the public. Many of the cases that we handle involve more than just a question of who was right or wrong; they involve the public’s interest in knowing that their government is acting in accordance with the law.”

The “minister of justice” approach asserts that a government attorney must examine all of the evidence, ask pertinent questions and not accept the answers  in blind faith. It is self-evident that state agencies and the general public are best served when fraud and criminal activity are identified and exposed.

Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Bryan Bertram is representing the Board of Registration in Medicine in my case before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court  under advisement by Justice Hines.   As a state  attorney representing a state agency he has taken the hired gun approach and his tactics are consistent with many  similar physician health related cases across the Country as his focus has been on administrative law technicalities and he has completely ignored the critical issues.  He has additionally protracted the time by tolling it to (or exceeding) administrative time limitations and filed multiple motions for extension as can be seen on the case docket. 

Tolling the time is the primary tactic for dismissing cases and limiting the scope of judicial review.  The Administrative Record was filed in my case after the 90-day deadline was missing everything I had submitted.  None of the  petitions or evidence of misconduct was found anywhere and had I not known about Massachusetts Superior Court Standing Order No. 1-96  (standing-order-1-96-amended ) Justice Hines review would have been limited to what they submitted.

Massachusetts Superior Court Standing Order No. 1-96 (3) (standing-order-1-96-amended) states in part that a “Motion for leave to present additional evidence “ must be served “in accordance with Superior Court Rule 9A not latcr than twenty (20) days after service of the record by the administrative agency” and that “any party failing to serve such a motion within the prescribed time limit, or within any court-ordered extension, shall be deemed to have waived any such motion (unless relating to jurisdiction) and the case shall Proceed solely on the basis of the record.”

Similar restrictions exist in other states but the primary problem is the attorneys representing doctors in these cases do not divulge this information and do not “bite the hand that feeds.”   Much to the surprise and chagrin of those who filed the Administrative Record I knew about the time limitation and the filed Administrative Record was missing anything and everything related to fraud and criminal activity. Both the primary evidence and their petitionary arguments were nowhere to be found.   Bertram “corrected” the Administrative Record twice by adding the petition for the hearing currently under judicial review as well as a critical document that was submitted as evidence for the same hearing by adding my copies and making excuses for their absence claiming the former was inadvertently “left off the docket” and the latter was “lost” due to my hand delivery of it.   Both are implausible and under a recent public records law we were able to retrieve documents the medical board previously had refused to provide that were date-stamped long after the hearings at which they were supposedly heard.

Over time Bertram’s defense of the medical board has gone beyond zealous advocacy and into the realm of overzealous apologism and this begs the question-who or what is this man representing?  .His fabrications and absurd logical fallacy were the topic of my recent blog discussing his grasping at straws by fabricating an imaginary off-site storage unit and claiming documents are typically scanned after board proceeding not before in a perverse logic that defies the sacred writ to which he so fastidiously abides.  According to the Manual for Conducting Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings 2012 edition edited by Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Quinlan, Jr. (admin-adjuc-training-manual):

“If a party intends to introduce a document into evidence at the hearing, copies of it should be provided to the other parties and to the presiding officer ahead of time.”³

In “The Ethics of Willful Ignorance” which appeared in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics Rebecca Roiphe notes that criminal enterprises “play with division of labor and responsibility and succeed by creating a sum more powerful than the enterprise’s parts and they do so, in part, by making sure that no individual and no firm is the repository for all the knowledge or all the wrongdoing. This creates “plausible deniability” , which protects both individuals and the enterprise. Lawyers often contribute to this dynamic by “defining their job narrowly.”⁴

Government attorneys representing state medical boards often get cases dismissed based on administrative law technicalities. They are largely unaware of what lies beneath. Such is not the case here. From the beginning Bertram has been fully aware of the evidence and critical issues.  He has been given documentary evidence that is not only precise and unequivocal but abundant. These clearly and persuasively show criminal acts including fabricating evidence, concealing evidence and perjury.  Multiple felonies perpetrated by Dr. Luis Sanchez of the Massachusetts physician health program Physician Health Services, Inc. (PHS) are loud and clear but Bertram He has turned a blind eye to them.   These documents that were presented to Physician Health and Compliance Unit Board counsel Deb Stoller over the course of five-years as evidence were never seen by the Board and have been concealed.  Board Policy 94-002 ( physician-health-and-compliance-unit )which  created PHCU board counsel within but independent of the medical board afforded her and PHCU board counsel the power to act both as a “hearing officer” and present cases to the Board and recommend disposition.   Bertram’s raison d’etre appears to be as a lackey for Stoller rather than “minister of justice” as over the course of more than a year he has done nothing more than demur, nix, rebuff and evade substantive and serious issues that have import far beyond the Commonwealth. And when Justice Hines gave a clear order at an April 29^th hearing to negotiate with the medical board he kept his cards close to the vest as the negotiations never went past Deb Stoller and her underlings at the PHCU in machinations that would have in effect removed me from judicial review and placed me directly in the palms of the perpetrators and relegating all of the evidence of criminal activity into oblivion.

The net-sum of all of this is that I do not believe Bertram is representing the best interests of the agency or the public good but protecting the physician health racket in the same manner as the PHCU as even a “hired gun” would have folded by now and another curious development is notable.   A Notice of Withdrawal was filed with the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) immediately following a Motion for summary judgment submitted on August 9, 2016.

The only plausible situations for such when considering the given situations for which an attorney must or may withdraw from a case are those that involve fraud and legal or professional conduct violations.  The  Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16  provides the many situations in which an attorney must or may withdraw his or her appearance in a case before the Court. Under Rule 1.16 (a), an attorney must withdraw if:

1. the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law;
2. the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or
3. the lawyer is discharged.

Rule 1.16 (b) lists the circumstances in which an attorney may withdraw and whether must or may this requires permission from the court and I suspect the attorney (who is in the same administrative law department at the AGO and a superior of Bertram) laid his eyes on what the documents show for the first time and high-tailed it down to the SJC to withdraw from the case as due to the scope and severity of what the evidence clearly shows and realized he too would be violating the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16 if he continued to get behind Bertram.   But why has Bertram not jumped ship? He not only should have jumped ship but was required to long ago.

The criminal misconduct and fraud is obvious to anyone and this includes any  pre-teen who has watched a a handful of “CSI” or “Law and Order.”  Comment 3 to Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client) states that “ As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances and “a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.”   The falsely-created evidence and perjury are here are not just obvious but glaringly obvious and bedazzled in sequins and day-glo.  The documents are specific, precise and crystal clear. They are also copious and redundant.  No ambiguity or doubt or alternative hypothesis exist.  Therefore Bertram’s “willful ignorance” card is is a bust. His continued defense of the indefensible is rife with contradictions, flip-flops, non-sequiturs, absolute nonsense  and outright fabrications.  This has  become glaringly obvious and his candor patina is chock full of holes.  The simple and direct but inconvenient fact is that the documentary evidence shows clear and detailed evidence of flagrant fraud and inexcusable misconduct that is displayed so plainly and comprehensibly that any reasonable person including a child could recognize it.  One does not have to be an attorney to see it as the only two conditions that would prevent its recognition are being asleep or the inability to read. The truth is neither arcane nor equivocal and this renders Bertram in full violation of the Rules of Professional conduct and he has dug his heels into the ground and stuck his head in the sand for over a year.  E-mail exchanges show exactly what he was told and when and ignorance here is not bliss as his falsely feigned “I know nothing” indifference is not not simply apathetic but pathetic.  It is unbelievable and absurd.   He might as well claim that he was under the impression that the  sky was  yellow and the sun was blue.

He has, however, scurrilously followed his physician health racket playbook to sling obstacles in my way. Most recently we filed a Motion for Immediate Relief with the Court and this request was met with Bertram filing two consecutive one-week extensions (which are perfectly legal) that tolled the time up to the beginning of his two-week vacation and egregiously the Motion that was filed was intended to prevent specific and irreversible consequences that would impact my daughters.  Bertram’s orchestrated month-long interlude has now assured those consequences to be inevitable and one has already occurred but the fact of the matter is that he has been in clear and flagrant violation of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct (Mass. R. Prof. C.) and American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct for quite some time.

Sate physician health programs, their affiliated commercial drug testing labs and a number of “PHP-approved” drug and alcohol assessment and treatment engage respectively in “sham review,” forensic fraud and diagnostic rigging.  Profit is the primary directive and the means have become the ends.   This triumvirate machinery holds all the cards and it is a stacked deck  further compromised by “false shuffles” and “second dealing” perpetrated by moles within medical boards.   “Close to the vest” is a phrase that originated from poker players keeping their cards low on the table and close to their vests so they couldn’t be seen.  It is my guess that since my case has been in the Supreme Judicial Court nothing has made it past the physician health and compliance unit (PHCU) barricade and Bertram’s fraternization and skullduggery with the PHCU during the 60-days provided by Justice Hines is suspect.  When we asked to negotiate with individuals above and outside the PCHU Bertram claimed he did not have the authority to do so but as a representative of the chief legal officer of the state and given power to intervene  in legal proceedings this claim of powerlessness does not comport with reality and is just another one of his many excuses.  My guess is that the fraud and misconduct and Bertram’s actions are unbeknownst to his agency. Perhaps a  supervisor or two is in cahoots but the AGO at large is unaware of any of it just like the medical board is clueless to Stoller’s ethical and legal transgressions.   Any honest person with integrity and a moral compass would be shocked by what they are engaging in and sunshine is the best disinfectant.

What we have here is a lack of candor attempting to cover up a lack of candor covering up for a lack of candor. It is a lack of candor cubed.

My hope is that those of integrity who represent the majority of individuals at the AGO will take note and recognize the gravity of this and act accordingly as this is after all corruption and fraud.

Ethical Obligations of Government Attorneys

All lawyers are bound to adhere to the rules of professional conduct in the jurisdiction(s) where they practice. In Massachusetts, that means a lawyer must adhere to the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct (Mass. R. Prof. C.), and additional guidance can be found in the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct and related opinions. Several courts have held attorneys who litigate for the government to a higher ethical standard than that expected of private lawyers. See, e.g., Freeport McMoran Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 962 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The authority often cited by these cases is Ethical Consideration 7–14 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that government lawyers with discretionary power over the conduct of litigation have a responsibility to seek justice and should refrain from commencing or continuing unfair litigation and using the government’s economic power to bring about unjust settlements or results. Government attorneys should act as ministers of justice who seek to assist the court in reaching the right and just result and not act as zealous advocates assisting a particular government agency in reaching a preferred result.

In the United States, the chief legal officer of each state is known as the Attorney General. State Attorneys General (SAGs) can take a wide range of actions on behalf of their state and the public interest through law enforcement, litigation, investigatory activities, and law and policy reform work and the law grants the authority to use certain powers to carry out the requirements of their positions. These powers include “the duty to appear for and defend the state and its agencies,” “the right to intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest,” and “the authority to prosecute criminal activity, in the absence of express legislative restriction.” (NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 20–23 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross eds., 2007)

Duty to Reveal Falsehood and Perjury

Under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3, a lawyer is prohibited from making false statements of material fact or offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false:

If the lawyer has offered, or the lawyer’s client or witnesses testifying on behalf of the client have given, material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.

A lawyer is in violation of that rule if any misrepresentation is made to the tribunal, irrespective of whether that misrepresentation is material and that duty continues to the conclusion of the proceeding and the comments to that rule affirmatively obligate an attorney to take reasonable remedial measures to correct to correct it and the obligation extends to all “tribunals” where statements and evidence are provided under oath. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0 (c) provides the following definition:

“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.”

Under this definition, if the administrative agency is acting in an adjudicatory manner, an attorney has all the ethical duties as if she were appearing in court and the most significant duties involve those under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal. This rule has several subparts which impose duties upon an attorney. Under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 an attorney shall not knowingly:

1. Make a false statement of fact or law, or fail to correct one previously made.
2. Fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client in a criminal or fraudulent act, unless such disclosure is prohibited under the confidentiality provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C, 1.6.
3. Fail to disclose controlling legal authority directly adverse to the position of the client if the other side has not done so.
4. Offer evidence the lawyer knows is false.
5. If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know it is false, this must be disclosed unless disclosure is prohibited under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
6. In an ex parte proceeding, the lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer to allow the tribunal to make an informed decision, even if the facts are adverse.

Under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, a lawyer has the discretionary ability to disclose information relating to the representation to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in which the client has used the lawyer’s services.

Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 provides that a lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or administrative agency in a non-adjudicatory proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and goes on to provide that the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” are also applicable, except the ex parte proceeding provision in Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(d). In addition, the lawyer is required to comply with the provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel,” and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5, “Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal.”

Willful Ignorance

How the Rules of Professional Conduct deal with willful ignorance is also examined in Rebecca Rolphe’s “The Ethics of Willful Ignorance.”⁴  When it comes to attorneys representing organizational client Rolphe notes:

“the tension between the duty of confidentiality and the reporting obligation plays no role.”

In other words, if an attorney working for an organization suspects that someone within that organization is engaged in misconduct it can be addressed.

The primary argument to support the willful ignorance of client misconduct is that confronting it could harm the attorney-client relationship. This argument fails, however,   when the attorney is representing an organization because the employees of an organization are not clients, the organization itself is.

An attorney generally has greater obligations due to the special role lawyers play in our legal system, and these obligations are recognized, if not clearly codified, in the Rules of Professional Conduct. And a government attorney has the greatest obligations of all, both as lawyer and as public servant.

If there is reasonable suspicion that an agency employee engaged in fraud or criminal activity it is the obligation of a government attorney to address the evidence directly and either affirm or refute wrongdoing. Brushing it off is not an option.

The Rules on competence and diligence (Rules 1.1 and 1.3) impose an obligation to know. To effectively advise it is essential that all facts be weighed not cherry picked.

Ignoring the Obvious—Disregard for all Outside Opinion, Evidence and Fact

 In “The Ethics of Willful Ignorance” Rolphe notes that criminal enterprises “play with division of labor and responsibility and succeed by creating a sum more powerful than the enterprise’s parts and they do so, in part, by making sure that no individual and no firm is the repository for all the knowledge or all the wrongdoing. This creates “plausible deniability” , which protects both individuals and the enterprise. Lawyers often contribute to this dynamic by “defining their job narrowly.”

Government attorneys have broad obligations to the agencies they represent and the public and should act as ministers of justice in seeking to guide the court to the right and just decision. This opposed to a private attorney zealously advocating for a client to guide the court to a preferred decision. Government attorneys must examine all of the evidence, ask questions and not accept the answers they are given in blind faith. Both the agency and the public are best served when misconduct, is identified through investigation and confrontation. If misconduct is found it must be addressed and those responsible held to account.  Comment 3 to Rule 1.13, referring to organizations as clients states “a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.”  

The “hired gun” model is deeply rooted in the adversarial system in which a lawyer’s duty is to provide zealous advocacy of a client’s interest as defined by that client. Assuming the client’s objective is legally permissible and that the representation does not violate some rule of legal ethics (such as the duty not to present knowingly perjured testimony), the strategic decisions are up to the client and once decided the attorney must zealously pursue it regardless of the impact on the opposing party or third parties. (See American Bar Association (ABA), ‘Model Rules of Professional Conduct’ (1983) r 1.2: ‘… A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation …’)

The standard set forth in rule 3.3 (e) “confirm[s] that the legal profession has accepted that an attorney’s ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not use false evidence. This special duty of an attorney to prevent and disclose frauds upon the court derives from the recognition that perjury is as much a crime as tampering with witnesses or jurors by way of promises and threats, and undermines the administration of justice.” (Footnote and citation omitted.) Nix v. Whiteside, supra at 168-169. There is no constitutional or permissible right of a defendant to testify falsely.

Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0 provides the following terminology:

(g) “Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

(m) “Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.

Fabrication, concealment and falsification of evidence and forensic fraud and perjury are all illustrated clearly and precisely and anyone looking at them could ascertain the import.

Falsely created evidence in collusion with a drug-testing lab is obvious forensic fraud and a civil conspiracy yet Bertram refers to this intentional and deliberate false creation of evidence as a “chain-of-custody issue.”  He claims no crimes exist because no criminal charges exist but the documentary evidence is consistent with the DOJ definition of laboratory fraud . Additional crimes include wire fraud-18 USC 1341 (the request to the lab was by fax), false statements 18-USC 1001 and conspiracy-18 USC 371.

There should be zero-tolerance for laboratory misconduct, especially in Massachusetts.   This also shows an unethical tone at the top and top-down corruption as the collusion is between the former president of the Federation of State Physician Health Programs (FSPHP) and VP of laboratory operations at USDTL. The fact that it involves a drug-testing lab serving state PHPs on a national basis and that multiple suicides have occurred from allegedly falsified tests renders this a very serious crime.

Perjury is a most serious common-law felony that is punishable in Massachusetts by up to twenty years’ imprisonment in noncapital cases under M. G. L. c. 268, § 1 and changing a forensic sample to clinical creates protected health information (PHI) and this  represents the worst HIPAA-criminal violation I can find anywhere and .Sanchez is practicing medicine fraudulently, in violation of G. L. c. 112, ‘ 5 (c), and 243 [Code Mass. Regs. ‘] 1.03(5)(a)(3) (1994) and engaging in “conduct that has the capacity to deceive or defraud, in violation of G. L. c. 112, ‘ 5 (h), and 243 Code Mass. Regs. ‘ 1.03(5)(a)(10) (1994)”; “misconduct in the practice of medicine, in violation of 243 Code Mass. Regs. ‘ 1.03(5)(a)(18) (1993)”; and “conduct which undermines public confidence in the integrity of the medical profession and shows a lack of good moral character as defined by Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 387 Mass. 708 (1982) and Levy v. Board of Registration [& Discipline] in Medicine, 378 Mass. 519 (1979).”  The Board may discipline doctors who lack good moral character or who undermine the public confidence in the integrity of the medical profession. Id.; Raymond v. Board of Registration in Med., 387 Mass. 708, 443 N.E.2d 391 (1982).  In this case any junior-high school student of reasonable prudence and competence could ascertain the fabrication, misrepresentation and suppression of evidence.   It is unequivocal.  It is also being overlooked and that is unacceptable.

Reasonable Remedial Measure Required

ABA Formal Opinion 87-353 states:

“If, prior to the conclusion of the proceedings, a lawyer learns that the client has given testimony the lawyer knows is false, and the lawyer cannot persuade the client to rectify the perjury, the lawyer must disclose the client’s perjury to the tribunal…z’

Reasonable remedial measures” include (1) trying to convince the client to offer truthful testimony, (2) attempting to withdraw from representation, (3) limiting the scope of questioning to avoid the perjury, and (4) as a last resort, disclosing the perjury (or intended perjury) to the court.

A lawyer is not required to take remedial measures merely because the lawyer suspects that a client has committed perjury or intends to commit perjury. The lawyer must have a firm factual basis, based in the lawyer’s actual knowledge, that the client has committed perjury or intends to commit perjury. A lawyer is not required to investigate the facts but also must not turn a blind eye to situations where false evidence or perjury is highly likely. Thus, if an attorney is aware of false evidence or perjury these ethical obligations come into play and a lawyer must attempt to remedy the situation.

According to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.13(c), a Government lawyer representing an organization must examine Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, 3.3, and 4.1

Rule 1.6(b)(1) requires disclosure of confidential information gained in the representation to prevent conduct that is likely to cause, among other things, “substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another.”

Rule 3.3(a)(2) requires a lawyer to disclose a material fact to a tribunal to avoid assisting a client’s criminal or fraudulent act.

Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.1(b) prohibits a failure to disclose a material fact to a third person if disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client’s criminal or fraudulent act.

Any of the circumstances outlined in these three rules requires an attorney to blow the whistle and three should have been blowing long ago Pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, 3.3, and 4.1 and Rule 1.6(b)(1) Bertram was required to disclose the misconduct and fraud not pretend it isn’t there and it is morally imperative that the evidence of fraud and criminal misconduct be exposed and those involved held accountable as the opportunity may never arise again.

The physician health racket relies primarily on silence, secrecy and control of the information. They have devised a system in which “point-people” punt and deflect complaints and systems are put in place to intercept and stifle valid complaints. For example placing an apologist or lackey on an ethics committee as a “cognizant reviewer” prevents complaints from ever being seen by the full committee—just intercept and toss it and Board Policy 94-002 creating Physician Health and Compliance Unit (PHCU) Board counsel and providing “hearing officer” powers put the fates of many completely in the hands of these shills and Bertram seems to be zealously representing their interests and not the interests of the agency or the public good unless you are among those lining your pockets in this racket.

The objective of judicial review is not only to resolve a disagreement between an individual and a government agency over a specific decision, but also to ascertain the legality of that decision, to prevent abuse of power, and to achieve justice.   Hopefully this will soon transpire. But justice requires that those responsible for wrongdoing be identified and held accountable and those include Sanchez, Stoller and Bertram.

 

1. Harschbarger S. A Note From the Attorney General. Agency Counsel Newsletter. Office of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 021081997.

2. Lanctot CJ. ‘The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions’. Southern California Law Review. 1991;64(951).

3. : ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION, GOVERNMENT BUREAU OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL MARTHA COAKLEYCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS;2012.

4. Roiphe R. The Ethics of Willful Ignorance. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics. 2011;24(1).